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The city of New York has been initiating litigation to protect its interests for over
a hundred years. One of the older cases commenced by the city, which made its way
to the United States Supreme Court, was brought in 1829.1 In that case, the city
sued a ship owner under a state statute for the failure of the shipmaster to report to
the mayor the name and description of passengers who had been brought to the city
in the ship.2 The question before the Court was whether this statute was an exercise
of the state’s police power to prevent the influx of paupers, or whether it was a
regulation of commerce and therefore subject to the Commerce Clause. In 1837,
after hearing argument twice,3 the Supreme Court rejected the Commerce Clause
challenge and upheld the statute as a valid exercise of the police power.4
While Commerce Clause and immigration jurisprudence have changed
significantly, immigration and public assistance are still important themes for the
city’s affirmative litigation.
In 1982, Corporation Counsel Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. established the
Affirmative Litigation Division in the Office of the Corporation Counsel in order to
better focus on advancing the city’s interests through commencing litigation.5
This article describes lawsuits litigated by the Affirmative Litigation Division
on behalf of the city in the recent past, and divides those lawsuits into two broad
categories. In the first category, the city, like other business enterprises, sues to
protect its financial or proprietary interests. In the second, the city sues as a
governmental actor, and here policy and politics play a more obvious role than in the
typical commercial lawsuit.
I.

CITY AS COMMERCIAL ACTOR

In the commercial arena, the decision to sue is not at all mysterious. The city
enters into commercial relationships just like other entities, signing contracts and
leases and owning property. This “business” is run by the appropriate city agencies
on behalf of the city. When a problem arises under such a commercial arrangement,
the agency’s commissioners, program staff, or general counsel seek Law Department
help in enforcing obligations in accordance with the rules of commerce. Enforcement
mechanisms usually take the form of damages suits, so that the city can recover its
actual loss and deter future misbehavior. If private businesses know that the city will
enforce its rights just like other businesses, they will be more likely to comply with
contracts and leases. Just like any other attorney, the Corporation Counsel is looking
out for the client’s money, which in this case, is really the public’s money or the
taxpayer’s money. The following are some examples of commercial suits initiated by
the city.
1.

See Mayor of N.Y. v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837).

2.

Id. at 130. The statute required the commander of every ship from outside the state of New York
arriving at the port of New York to give the mayor the information of every person on the ship, including
his or her name, place of birth, last legal settlement, age, and occupation. See id. at 130–31.

3.

Id. at 106.

4.

Id. at 132.

5.

See Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Lawyers for Government Have Unique Responsibilities and Opportunities
to Influence Public Policy, 53 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 375 (2009).
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A. Asbestos Litigation
The city was one of the first municipalities to sue asbestos manufacturers to
recover the cost of abating asbestos in schools and other public buildings.6 As the
number of cases against asbestos manufacturers continued to rise, the city’s recovery
efforts shifted to bankruptcy court and to the assertion of claims against trusts
created by the bankruptcies. When the Johns-Manville Corporation—the largest
manufacturer of asbestos in the world—sought bankruptcy protection,7 Affirmative
Litigation Division attorneys served on the committee that negotiated the plan that
resulted in the first asbestos trust created to pay those injured by asbestos, including
property owners such as cities and school districts. The city also played a major role
in the bankruptcies of other defendants, such as National Gypsum, Kentile Flooring,
U.S. Mineral, Keene, and Celotex. In fact, the city was the major claimant in the
Celotex bankruptcy, which resulted in the creation of a trust of more than one billion
dollars.8 Competition for this large pot of money was intense between personal
injury claimants and property damage claimants, such as the city. After the city
received more than $11 million from the Celotex trust, the Celotex trustees, allied
with personal injury lawyers, refused to pay the balance of the city’s claims.9 The
city took the lead in litigation challenging the actions of the trustees and won
repeatedly in the bankruptcy court. The trust appealed, first to the district court
and then to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. There, the court ruled
largely in the city’s favor, resulting in an additional payment of more than $47
million.10
The city has thus far collected over $130 million from asbestos-related defendants
and is the single largest recipient of asbestos bankruptcy recoveries.
B. Insurance Litigation
The city requires its contractors and permittees to procure insurance coverage for
both themselves and the city. A few years ago, attorneys in the Affirmative Litigation
Division noticed that when the city and a contractor were sued in tort over an incident
that arose in connection with the contractor’s work, the contractor would be defended
6.

See, e.g., City of New York v. Keene Corp., 505 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1986), aff ’d, 513
N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1st Dep’t 1987) (upholding causes of action for indemnity and restitution). Discovery
issues were litigated, see, e.g., City of New York v. Keene Corp., 756 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1st Dep’t 2003), as
were issues of successor liability (compare City of New York v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 688 N.Y.S.2d 23
(1st Dep’t 1999) (finding Pfizer not liable as successor), with City of New York v. Aaer Sprayed
Insulations, Inc., 722 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1st Dep’t 2001) (finding successor liability); see also City of New
York v. Aaer Sprayed Insulations, Inc., 583 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1st Dep’t 1992) (declaring that the alter ego
question is an issue of fact).

7.

See Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988).

8.

See Asbestos Settlement Trust v. City of New York (In re Celotex Corp.), 487 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir.
2007).

9.

Id. at 1326–27.

10. Id. at 1327. The court awarded the city $40 million without interest.
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by the insurance company, but the city would be left to defend itself. To remedy
that, the city has developed an insurance and declaratory judgment practice that has
so far resulted in over $150 million in savings to the city.11 When there is a tort suit
that arises in connection with the work of a contractor or a permittee, the city now
tenders that suit to the insurance company and demands defense and indemnification.
In this respect, the city is behaving just like any other commercial actor in identifying
and protecting its rights, and is reaping substantial financial benefits as a result.
C. Foreign Mission Tax Litigation
In order to establish the validity of tax liens on portions of buildings that house
consulates and missions to the United Nations, the city sued three foreign
governments—the Republic of the Philippines, the Permanent Mission of India to
the United Nations, and the principal Resident Representative to the United Nations
of the Mongolian People’s Republic. With respect to the Philippines, the city
claimed taxes were due on portions of the property used for a restaurant, a bank, and
an airline office. With respect to India and Mongolia, the city claimed taxes were
due on portions of the property used as residences for employees below the level of
Head of Mission. The case involved the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, customary international law, the
Federal Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), New York common law, and New York
Real Property Tax Law.12
India and Mongolia moved to dismiss on the ground that they were immune
from the jurisdiction of the federal courts under the FSIA.13 The motion was denied
by the district court and affirmed by the Second Circuit.14 Corporation Counsel
Michael A. Cardozo argued the case before the United States Supreme Court, which
affirmed jurisdiction pursuant to the FSIA’s “immovable property exception” to
11.

See generally City of New York v. Evanston Ins. Co., 830 N.Y.S.2d 299, 301–03 (2d Dep’t 2007) (holding
that where an endorsement provided coverage to the city only if the loss “is determined to be solely the
negligence or responsibility of [the named insured],” and a stranger to the policy was held at least partly
responsible for the accident, the city was still entitled to a defense, since it was “solely” the insured and
not the city who was alleged to be liable); City of New York v. Zurich-Am. Ins. Group, 811 N.Y.S.2d
773 (2d Dep’t 2006) (holding that where Zurich defended the city’s co-defendant bus company, but
ignored the city’s requests for counsel, and the city settled the underlying tort case, Zurich could not
challenge the reasonableness of the settlement even though the city’s answer was stricken in the
underlying tort case); City of New York v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 805 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1st Dep’t 2005) (holding
that there was no prejudice to the insurer due to the city providing a late notice of legal action where the
insurer already had notice of suit from the named insured, was participating in the litigation, and had
received a complaint against the city from its named insured); City of New York v. St. Paul Fire and
Marine Ins. Co., 801 N.Y.S.2d 362 (2d Dep’t 2005) (holding that the insurer’s delay of more than four
months in disclaiming coverage was unreasonable when the alleged basis for denying coverage was
readily apparent).

12. See City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 376 F. Supp. 2d 429

(S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff ’d, 446 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2006), aff ’d, 127 S. Ct. 2352 (2007).
13. Permanent Mission of India, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 430.
14.

Permanent Mission of India, 446 F.3d at 377; Permanent Mission of India, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 439.

494

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

VOLUME 53 | 2008/09

immunity.15 The Court held that a tax lien “inhibits one of the quintessential rights
of property ownership—the right to convey. It is therefore plain that a suit to
establish the validity of a lien implicates ‘rights in immovable property,’” and falls
within the exception to immunity.16 After the jurisdictional ruling, the district court
granted the city’s motion for summary judgment validating the tax liens and assessing
taxes against India and Mongolia, and as to the Philippines, assessing taxes on the
premises except for the portion occupied by the restaurant.17 The total judgment in
favor of the city exceeded $57 million.18
II. CITY AS GOVERNMENTAL ACTOR

The city also initiates litigation in its capacity as a governmental actor. Unlike
the typical commercial lawsuit, these suits can easily reflect the policy preferences of
elected officials, particularly the mayor. The city has long brought suits to further
the policy initiatives of the city’s chief executive and to implement and enforce policy
initiatives enacted into local law by the city council. As the examples below show,
the interests of the city are often broadly construed in these lawsuits.
A. Public Health and Safety Litigation
First, the city has initiated regulatory litigation, as part of its mission to ensure
public health and safety. These cases include gun litigation, suits over cigarette
taxes, and immigration issues.
Gun Litigation
In 2000, the city brought suit against a group of gun manufacturers whose guns
were recovered in New York City in connection with criminal activity.19 The suit
alleged that the gun manufacturers knew, or should have known, that some of their
dealers were disproportionately supplying the criminal market for guns through
negligent or intentional sales practices, 20 and that those practices created a public
nuisance within the city.21 The suit was stayed after September 11, 2001 because the
offices of the Corporation Counsel were closed, making case files unavailable.22 The
15.

Permanent Mission of India, 127 S. Ct. at 2358.

16. Id. at 2356.
17.

City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 533 F. Supp. 2d 457, 469–70
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).

18. City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 538 F. Supp. 2d 701, 704

(S.D.N.Y. 2008). This decision, and the decision granting the city’s motion for summary judgment,
Permanent Mission of India, 533 F. Supp. 2d 457, are currently on appeal to the Second Circuit as of the
time of this writing.
19.

See City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).

20. See id. at 284.
21.

Id. at 276.

22.

Id. at 262.
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parties were also awaiting a state appellate court decision on a suit brought by New
York State.23 The state’s case was eventually dismissed.24 The city’s case, however,
proceeded.25
The city’s continued prosecution of this suit resulted in running battles with
Congress, starting in 2004, over the use of data collected in a previously-public
firearms trace database by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(“BATF”).26 In 2005, a few weeks before the trial date, President Bush signed the
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, which appeared to give the gun
industry sweeping immunity from most tort lawsuits.27 When the defendants moved
to dismiss the case under the statute, the city successfully argued that the suit fell
within a statutory exception for actions that alleged a violation of state or federal law
applicable to the sale of firearms. 28 The defendants appealed, and the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in a two-to-one decision dated April 30,
2008. 29 The court held that New York Penal Law Section 240.45, the nuisance
statute under which the city claimed the exception, is a statute of general applicability
that does not expressly regulate firearms, has not been applied by the courts to the
sale and marketing of firearms, and cannot clearly be said to implicate the sale and
marketing of firearms. 30 Therefore, the court concluded, the federal statutory
exception does not encompass New York Penal Law Section 240.45.31
In 2006, the city brought two public nuisance suits against twenty-seven gun
dealers whose guns were recovered in connection with crimes in the city. 32 The
23.

See People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1st Dep’t 2003).

24.

Id. at 204.

25.

See Beretta, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 286.

26. See generally City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 234 F.R.D. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that

the 2006 Rider to the 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act does not deprive the court of jurisdiction);
City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 429 F. Supp. 2d 517 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that the 2006
Rider to 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act does not preclude the city from introducing data in its
possession); City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 228 F.R.D. 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that
the 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act does not preclude BATF production of trace data), reh’g
granted and aff ’d, 228 F.R.D. 147 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that the discovery order should have been
complied with before the effective date of the 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act); Johnson v. Bryco
Arms, 222 F.R.D. 48 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), aff ’g City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 51
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that the 2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act does not preclude BATF
production of trace data pursuant to a subpoena and subject to a protective order).
27.

See City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 244, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).

28. Id. at 261–64.
29. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed,

77 U.S.L.W. 3267 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2008) (No. 08-530).
30. Id. at 399–400.
31.

Id.

32.

See City of New York v. Bob Moates’ Sport Shop, Inc., No. 06-CV-6504, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11699
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction); City of New
York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 247 F.R.D. 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction).
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litigation followed an undercover investigation targeting dealers whose guns were
most frequently recovered in connection with New York City crime. The lawsuits
were recently resolved, with twenty-one of the defendant gun dealers reaching
settlements with the city. The settlements generally provide for a court-appointed
Special Master to provide training and education, recommend stringent sales
practices, and monitor the dealers to assure compliance. The remaining defendants
were either dismissed or defaulted.
Cigarette Taxes
The high tax on cigarettes sold in New York City gives rise to robust attempts at
tax avoidance. Many attempt to purchase untaxed, “bootleg” cigarettes over the
Internet. Internet sellers in a low-tax state will offer cigarettes stamped according to
that state’s law, which, because of the negligible tax there, retail for far less than
cigarettes sold in New York. The cigarettes are mailed to New York Internet
customers, who have paid the out-of-state price to the out-of-state Internet seller.
Under the federal Jenkins Act,33 an out-of-state cigarette vendor selling to a New
York buyer must report such sales to the New York tax authorities. The New York
tax authorities can then collect the New York use tax from the New York buyer, who
is liable for the tax regardless of where the purchase is made. In line with a major
anti-smoking policy initiative by Mayor Michael A. Bloomberg and the Commissioner
of Health, Thomas R. Frieden, the Affirmative Litigation Division brought several
lawsuits seeking to stop the flow of untaxed cigarettes into the city. One suit is
against approximately thirty-five out-of-state Internet cigarette sellers under the civil
Racketeer Inf luenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), based on their
failure to file Jenkins Act reports, and on state law consumer fraud and public
nuisance claims. 34 After several defendants settled with the city, the case was
dismissed against the remaining defendants but recently reversed on appeal.35 The
New York Court of Appeals found that the city had standing to sue under RICO
where it has alleged a direct injury of lost taxes inflicted on it by reason of defendant
cigarette retailers’ alleged commission of mail and wire fraud through the sale of
cigarettes to residents of the city without complying with the Jenkins Act.36
Another suit was brought against the principal wholesalers of untaxed cigarettes
to New York Native American tribes under the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking

33.

15 U.S.C. § 376 (2006).

34. City of New York v. Cyco.net, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 2d 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d, City of New York v.

Smoke-Spirits.com, 541 F.3d 425 (2d Cir. 2008).
35.

Smoke-Spirits.com, 541 F.3d at 425.

36. Id. The court also certified to the New York Court of Appeals two questions of state law: whether the

city has standing to sue under the state’s General Business Law, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 (McKinney
2008), and whether the city may assert a common law public nuisance claim predicated on N.Y. Pub.
Health Law § 1399-ll. Smoke-Spirits.com, 541 F.3d at 457–58.
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Act (“CCTA”).37 The CCTA penalizes the sale and possession of untaxed cigarettes,
provided the taxing locality has an “applicable” cigarette tax.38 Although New York
wholesalers are permitted to sell untaxed cigarettes to Native American tribes for
consumption by tribe members, they are not permitted to sell untaxed cigarettes to
reservation retailers who re-sell the cigarettes to the public.39 The wholesalers moved
to dismiss, claiming that New York State’s adoption of a “forbearance policy,”
pursuant to which the state “forbears” from enforcing the legislative tax requirement
and allows untaxed cigarettes to be sold to reservation-based retailers, made the
CCTA inapplicable.40 The court recently denied this motion, finding that the New
York statute requiring tax stamps to be affixed to all cigarettes includes those sold by
reservation retailers for resale to the public, and that the state’s policy of “forbearance”
or non-enforcement does not bar liability under the CCTA.41
In addition, the city recently commenced litigation against eight cigarette sellers
located on the Poospatuck Reservation in Mastic, Long Island, for selling massive
quantities of cigarettes on which state and city taxes have not been paid, alleging
violations of the CCTA and state law.42
Immigration Issues
Various mayors have taken the view that there are public health and safety
reasons, as well as fiscal reasons, to encourage so-called “undocumented” aliens—
people in the country without papers legitimizing their presence—to come “out of
the shadows,” in particular to ensure that the aliens are willing to report crime to the
police and seek necessary health care.43 In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”) to provide legalization to those undocumented
aliens who qualified and filed a timely application.44 The program had a one-year
application period and was to expire on May 4, 1988.45 In 1988, the city, consistent
with the policy view described above, joined with the state and a plaintiff class to
challenge the regulations promulgated by the Immigration and Naturalization
37.

City of New York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 550 F. Supp. 2d 332 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). The CCTA is
codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2341–2346 (2006).

38. See 18 U.S.C. § 2341.
39.

Milhelm Attea & Bros., 550 F. Supp. 2d at 337.

40. Id. at 337–39, 344 n.2.
41.

Id. at 348.

42.

City of New York v. Golden Feather Smoke Shop, Inc., No. 08-CV-03966 (E.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 29,
2008).

43.

See generally Exec. Order No. 41 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://home2.nyc.gov/html/imm/
downloads/pdf/exe_order_41.pdf; Exec. Order No. 34 (May 13, 2003), available at http://search.citylaw.
org/isysquery/873c3005-348e-457c-8b7d-258626c0cae0/4/doc; Exec. Order No. 124 (Aug. 7, 1989),
available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/library/queens/PDF_files/Orders/ord124.pdf.

44. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
45.

Dep’t of Homeland Security IRCA Legalization Provisions, 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2.
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Service (“INS”).46 The statute provided that an alien had to demonstrate a history of
employment evidencing self-support without receipt of public cash assistance.47
However, the INS regulations expanded this by requiring the alien to demonstrate
that his or her immediate family members also had not received any public cash
assistance.48 The parties also challenged the INS’s failure to broadly disseminate
complete and accurate information about the legalization program.49
As a result of the suit, the INS revised its regulations and reevaluated all
applicants who had submitted timely applications.50 The plaintiffs were unable,
however, to persuade the court to extend the deadline for legalization applications.51
Various mayors, starting with Mayor Edward I. Koch in 1989, implemented
executive orders setting forth the city’s policy of protecting the confidentiality of
information regarding aliens and encouraging them to use city services.52 In 1996,
Congress passed two statutes, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Act of 1996 (“Welfare Reform Act”)53 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“Immigration Reform Act”), 54 which
appeared to preempt the city’s authority under the executive order to prohibit city
officials from transmitting information respecting aliens to the INS. In furtherance
of the city’s confidentiality policy, the city brought a facial challenge to these federal
laws, which was unsuccessful.55
B. Litigation over State and Federal Funds
In addition to public health and safety litigation, the city, as a governmental
actor, also initiates litigation against other levels of government over funding and
revenues. These fiscal suits often involve political and policy issues as well. For
example, the city has sued the state over funding for a wide variety of public programs,
46. Perales v. Thornburgh, 967 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1992).
47.

Id. at 801 (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(iii) (2006)).

48. Perales, 967 F.2d at 802 (referring to 52 Fed. Reg. 16,209 (May 1, 1987) (codified as amended at 8

C.F.R. § 245a.1(i) (1992))).
49. See Perales, 967 F.2d at 801 (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(i) (2006)).
50. Perales, 967 F.2d at 814–15.
51.

See Perales v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff ’ d, 847 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1988) (denying
preliminary injunction); Perales v. Thornburgh, 762 F. Supp. 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (upholding validity
of INS public charge regulations), rev’d, Perales v. Thornburgh, 967 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated,
509 U.S. 917 (1993) (vacating the decision in light of Reno v. Catholic Social Services, 509 U.S. 43
(1993) and remanding Perales v. Thornburgh, 4 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1993) and Perales v. Reno, 48 F.2d
1305 (2d Cir. 1995)).

52.

Exec. Order No. 124, supra note 43.

53.

Pub. L. No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 8, 21 and 42 U.S.C.).

54. Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.).
55.

City of New York v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff ’d, 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1115 (2000).
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including foster care,56 public assistance,57 Medicaid,58 correctional expenses,59 and
the administrative costs of the federal food stamp program.60 However, any litigation
against the state involves budgetary and political considerations that are broader than
the particular public program at issue; the city is, after all, a political subdivision of
the state and a creature of state law. There may be legislative initiatives or negotiations
over revenues between the city and the state that are unrelated to the program under
consideration, but such political negotiations might influence the decision of whether
to sue. In addition, state agencies interpret state law or promulgate regulations that
the city might view as inconsistent with statute, depending on the city’s policy or
fiscal view of the matter.
Policy—and money—also factor into deciding whether to sue for federal funds.
The city’s policy regarding aliens, for example, prompted the city to challenge federal
regulations that denied prenatal care coverage under Medicaid to certain aliens.
Furthermore, because pregnant alien women who are ineligible for Medicaid may
seek prenatal care at city-funded facilities, the city had a fiscal interest in ensuring
Medicaid coverage.
This Medicaid prenatal care coverage question was litigated in Lewis v.
Thompson.61 This 1979 class action challenged the federal government’s regulatory
interpretation of the Medicaid statute to deny prenatal care coverage to certain aliens
who were not permanent residents or were not otherwise permanently residing in the
United States under color of law.62 The plaintiffs also challenged a companion New

56. See Sabol v. Perales, 82 N.Y.2d 685 (1993) (vacating state audit sanctions imposed on the city where the

state ignored its own published interpretation of regulations); City of New York v. Johnson, No.
400110/42005, N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3221 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Jan. 11, 2005) (holding that the state’s
formula for allocating foster care block grant monies was arbitrary and capricious).
57.

See Gross v. Perales, 72 N.Y.2d 231 (1988) (holding that the city’s challenge to a $20 million penalty
imposed for failure to comply with an unpromulgated internal state audit guideline could be heard in
the New York State Supreme Court, as opposed to the court of claims, and that the New York State
Supreme Court had authority to order incidental monetary relief); Flowers v. Perales, 565 N.Y.S.2d 504
(1st Dep’t 1991) (holding that certain state audit standards were unpromulgated and therefore could not
be a basis for penalty).

58. See Krauskopf v. Perales, 74 N.Y.2d 730 (1989) (upholding a state audit of the city where the state’s

standard was reasonable); City of New York v. Wing, 783 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1st Dep’t 2004) (holding that
the city’s claim that the state’s negligent programming of its computers caused the city to pay Medicaid
benefits to ineligible persons must proceed in the court of claims), appeal denied, 4 N.Y.3d 705 (2005).
59.

See City of New York v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 655 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1st Dep’t 1997) (holding that
the state must reimburse the city for inmates who have already been committed to state custody but are
temporarily in city custody for open cases pending in city courts).

60. See City of New York v. Lawton, 515 N.Y.S.2d 903 (3d Dep’t 1987) (remanding a suit for reimbursement

of food stamp administrative costs for determination of whether the state had good reason for delay
when the state Division of the Budget stalled implementation and lobbied to retroactively amend the
statute to deny reimbursement).
61.

252 F.3d 567, 569 (2d Cir. 2001).

62. Id. at 571–72.
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York State regulation. 63 The original lawsuit was brought against the city
commissioner of the Department of Social Services, George Gross, as the local social
services commissioner implementing state and federal law, along with state and
federal defendants.64
The Medicaid statute was subsequently amended. When the plaintiffs next
went before the district court, the caption had changed to Lewis v. Grinker, with
William Grinker now the city commissioner of the Department of Social Services.
However, the city had previously intervened as a plaintiff, joining the plaintiff class
against the federal and state defendants.65 The Second Circuit affirmed a permanent
injunction barring the denial of prenatal care to this category of aliens in what the
court called “the extremely rare instance where we can discern a clearly expressed
congressional intent contrary to the plain language of the statute.”66 After the
enactment of the Welfare Reform Act in 1996, the federal defendants sought
reconsideration of the injunction.67 Although the court agreed with the federal
defendants that Congress had now made clear its intent to deny federally subsidized
prenatal care to this category of aliens, it found that the denial of prenatal care to
alien mothers violated the equal protection rights of their citizen children.68 On
appeal, the caption finally changed to reflect the city’s role as a plaintiff-intervener,
rather than a defendant, but that satisfaction was short-lived, as the Second Circuit
reversed on most of the merits.69 However, the court did remand for a revised
injunction that assured that the plaintiff class has the same automatic eligibility for
their citizen children that is available to the children of citizen mothers.70 Even
though the city and the other plaintiffs lost in the end on most of the substantive
issues, the litigation ensured that the class of alien women involved received prenatal
care under Medicaid for approximately fourteen years, from the time of entry of an
injunction in 1987 until it was vacated in 2001.
Similarly, the city’s policy regarding abortion factored into the city’s decision to
challenge federal regulations under Title X of the Public Health Services Act.71 The
city joined the state of New York and federally-funded providers of family planning
63. Lewis v. Gross, 663 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (certifying class and granting summary judgment,

finding no alienage restriction in Medicaid statute).
64. Id.
65.

Lewis v. Grinker, 794 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (granting a permanent injunction against state
and federal officials from denying Medicaid coverage for prenatal care to alien pregnant women who
were not residing in this country under color of law); Lewis v. Grinker, No. CV-79-1740, 1987 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16780 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (granting a preliminary injunction barring the denial of Medicaid
coverage for prenatal care to the same class); id. at *5 (referring to the city as plaintiff-intervenor).

66. Lewis v. Grinker, 965 F.2d 1206, 1219 (2d Cir. 1992).
67.

Lewis v. Grinker, 111 F. Supp. 2d 142, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).

68. Id. at 185–86.
69. Lewis, 252 F.3d 567.
70. Id. at 591–92.
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300–300a-6 (2006).
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services to challenge these federal regulations, which prohibited Title X-sponsored
clinics from providing nondirective counseling to pregnant clients about abortion
and prohibited referrals to abortion providers.72 The regulations further provided
that any Title X provider must both physically and financially separate any abortion
services from the Title X family planning program.73 This challenge was ultimately
unsuccessful.74
The city has also joined advocacy groups challenging the Social Security
Administration’s narrow interpretation of disability eligibility. The decision of
whether to litigate such issues depends both on how the city’s policy makers view the
rights of the disabled and on fiscal considerations, since the city and the state have an
interest in shifting eligible individuals from city and state funded public assistance
programs to programs that are funded entirely by the federal government.
These disability issues were litigated in Bowen v. City of New York75 and Stieberger
v. Sullivan.76 In Bowen, the city, the New York City Health and Hospitals
Corporation, two state officials, and plaintiff class members sued the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”), challenging their treatment of severely mentally ill applicants for benefits
under the Social Security Disability Insurance Program and the Supplemental
Security Income Program.77 The suit alleged that SSA had a covert policy of
presuming that certain applicants had a residual capacity to work, rather than making
an individualized determination of work capacity.78 The district court held that the
covert policy was illegal and ordered the secretary to reopen the decisions denying or
terminating benefits and to redetermine eligibility.79 The court also ordered interim
benefits to all who had been terminated.80 The Second Circuit later affirmed the

72. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 179–80 (1991).
73. Id. at 180–81.
74.

The Court held, among other things, that the regulations were a permissible construction of the
underlying statute, id. at 187; that the government does not unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis
of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program to advance certain permissible goals, such as nonabortion family planning, id. at 193; that the regulations do not impinge on the doctor-patient
relationship, id. at 200; and that if a state can constitutionally refuse to fund abortions (as already held
by the Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989)), then a decision to
exclude abortion-related services from a family planning program would surely be constitutional, Rust,
500 U.S. at 202.

75. 476 U.S. 467 (1986).
76. 792 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
77.

Bowen, 476 U.S. at 469–72.

78. Id. at 473.
79. Id. at 476.
80. Id.
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district court,81 and Corporation Counsel Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. argued the
case before the United States Supreme Court, which affirmed.82
In Stieberger, the city and plaintiff class members again sued HHS and SSA to
challenge their policy of “nonacquiescence,” pursuant to which SSA instructed its
administrative law judges to disregard the decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit if those decisions conflicted with the secretary’s own
policies on whether an applicant is disabled.83 The district court certified the class
and enjoined the nonacquiescence policy.84 On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated
the injunction in light of a remedy that it had issued in another case, Stieberger v.
Bowen.85 In 1990, the district court dismissed some claims on statute of limitations
grounds and granted injunctive relief to the plaintiffs on other claims.86 In 1992, the
court approved a settlement agreement,87 which was soon thereafter amended.88
C. Litigation to Protect the City’s Power and Influence
In addition to these public health and safety suits, and suits against other levels
of government, the city as a governmental actor also may litigate in an attempt to
protect its political power and influence. For example, the city tried for over fifteen
years to enhance the accuracy of the census count, which the city believed significantly
undercounted urban residents who were members of minority groups or lived in lowincome neighborhoods. A more accurate census would inf luence congressional
apportionment for the state, influence the city’s numbers in the state legislature, and
would affect federal funding under programs that allocate resources based in part on
population.
This litigation was started by Mayor Edward I. Koch as a plaintiff in a challenge
to the 1980 census,89 was defended by Rudolph W. Giuliani during his tenure as
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and it continued
81.

Id. at 477.

82. Id. at 487.
83. Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
84. Id. at 1400.
85. 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
86. Stieberger v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
87.

Stieberger v. Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).

88. Stieberger v. Sullivan, 801 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
89. See Cuomo v. Baldrige, 674 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that state and city officials failed to

prove that the Bureau of the Census’s decision not to adjust the 1980 census was unreasonable or
arbitrary and capricious, and that the statistical methods proposed by the plaintiffs could not at the time
be reliably used to adjust the census); see also Carey v. Klutznick, 508 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
aff ’d, 637 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1980) (granting city and state officials a preliminary injunction ordering
the Bureau of the Census to compare records and process additional forms); Carey v. Klutznick, 508 F.
Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (ordering the Bureau of the Census to use statistical methods to produce a
more accurate census count than the unadjusted count and not certify New York’s population totals until
there was compliance with the court’s order), rev’d, Carey v. Klutznick, 653 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1981).
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during Mayor Giuliani’s mayoral term as a challenge by the city and others to the
1990 census.90 It spanned the tenure of six Corporation Counsels starting with
Allen G. Schwartz. When the suit began, Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. of Cravath,
Swaine & Moore LLP was representing the city (and other parties in the case); he
later became Corporation Counsel and continued to represent the city in that
capacity. When Peter L. Zimroth became Corporation Counsel, he came into the
litigation and never left, remaining as special counsel to the city even after his tenure
as Corporation Counsel was over. The litigation came to an end in 1996, when the
United States Supreme Court rejected the challenge in Wisconsin v. City of New
York.91
In addition to suits where the city itself is seeking to protect its power and
influence, there are also cases where the mayor is seeking to protect or define his
power and influence in relation to other city elected officials, often with respect to
the city council’s assertion of power.92 Generally, the Corporation Counsel represents
90. See City of New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 822 F. Supp. 906, 1124 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (upholding

the Secretary of the Department of Commerce’s 1991 decision not to adjust the 1990 census), rev’d, 34
F.3d 1114 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that the arbitrary and capricious standard used by the district court
was incorrect, and that the district court should have utilized the heightened scrutiny test applied in the
one-person, one-vote cases to determine whether the secretary’s decision was “essential to the
achievement of a legitimate governmental interest”), rev’d, Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1,
19 (1996) (holding that the secretary’s decision not to adjust the 1990 census was not subject to
heightened scrutiny and had to “bear only a reasonable relationship to the accomplishment of an actual
enumeration of the population”); City of New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 739 F. Supp. 761
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding that the Department of Commerce and officials administering the 1990
census fulfilled their obligations under a previously signed stipulation providing for the secretary to
revisit the issue of adjustment and take advice from an expert panel); City of New York v. U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, 713 F. Supp. 48 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
91.

Wisconsin, 517 U.S. at 1.

92.

See Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y., 9 N.Y.3d 23 (2007) (requiring the mayor to bargain with unions
representing fire alarm dispatchers and emergency medical technicians, rather than with unions
representing the majority of employees city-wide after local laws conferred “uniformed” status on these
employees, did not usurp the mayor’s powers); Council of N.Y v. Bloomberg, 6 N.Y.3d 380 (2006)
(finding that the Equal Benefits Law, which prohibited city agencies from entering into contracts with
entities that fail to provide employment benefits to domestic partners of its employees equal to those
provided to spouses, was preempted by state and federal law); Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y., 789
N.Y.S.2d 860 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2004) (finding that a 2001 council bill regulating apparel and
related purchases by mandating wage and labor standards for contractors and others unlawfully curtailed
mayoral powers by conferring additional contract-related powers on the comptroller and intruding on
the mayor’s power to determine bidder responsibility); Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y., 780 N.Y.S.2d
266 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2004) (finding that a 2002 council bill prohibiting the city from doing
business with entities the council defined as “predatory lenders” was preempted by state and federal laws
regulating banking and loans, and other state programs); Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y., 721 N.Y.S.2d
39 (1st Dep’t 2001), rev’g 696 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1999) (finding that a 1997 local law,
whereby the council would “designate” two members of a five member investigatory board, but the
mayor would retain the ultimate authority to make these appointments or to refuse to make the
appointments until the proposed designees meet with his approval, unlawfully curtailed the mayor’s
powers); Giuliani v. Council of N.Y., 688 N.Y.S.2d 413 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1999) (holding that a
1993 local law granting the council a veto over commuter van route approvals by the Taxi and Limousine
Commission was inconsistent with the state’s Transportation Law and the charter, and curtailed the
mayor’s powers); Council of N.Y. v. Giuliani, 679 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1st Dep’t 1998) (giving priority to a
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the mayor in these cases, and they typically arise when the mayor disagrees on a
policy basis with the council and vetoes a local law, which then passes over his veto.
It is also possible, however, that the mayor agrees on the policy issue, but has to
defend the allocation of power under the City Charter, and he therefore might litigate
over the validity of a local law even while agreeing with the policy it reflects.
Cases involving the allocation of power can either be affirmative cases brought
by the mayor, or defensive cases in which the mayor defends his decision not to
enforce a local law he believes to be invalid. For example, shortly before the effective
date of the Equal Benefits Law, Mayor Bloomberg began a declaratory judgment
action against the council, asserting that the law was inconsistent with, and preempted
by, federal and state law, and that it curtailed the Mayor’s powers.93 The Mayor
sought a temporary restraining order against the law’s enforcement, which was
denied. City attorneys then informed the supreme court justice hearing the matter
that the Mayor would withdraw his motion for a preliminary injunction and would
move promptly for summary judgment, and that in the meantime, the Mayor would
not enforce the Equal Benefits Law. The next day, the city council initiated an
Article 78 proceeding in the nature of mandamus to compel the Mayor and the city
to immediately implement and enforce the Equal Benefits Law. The Mayor then
raised as a defense the same assertions he had raised in his declaratory judgment
action against the council. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Mayor
was entitled to raise the invalidity of the law as a defense in the Article 78 proceeding,
and that, while he had a duty to implement valid legislation passed by the city council,
he also had a duty to comply with valid state and federal law.94 According to the
court, where the mayor concludes that a local law conflicts with a state or federal law,
the mayor’s obligation is to obey the latter, as the Mayor did in this case.95 The court
then went on to hold that the Equal Benefits Law was preempted by state contracting
law and by federal law.96
These are but a few examples of the kinds of suits the Corporation Counsel has
initiated on behalf of the city over the last twenty-five years.97 During that time
mayoral charter commission proposal over the council’s effort to place a referendum on the ballot
concerning the location of a new Yankee Stadium under the “ballot hierarchy” set forth in Municipal
Home Rule Law); Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y., 651 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1st Dep’t 1997) (invalidating a
1995 local law that established an Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board and vested in the
council the right to appoint two members of the five-member board, because the Municipal Home Rule
Law and the New York City Charter require a referendum when a local law transfers the power of the
mayor to the council).
93.

See Bloomberg, 6 N.Y.3d at 380 (2006).

94. Id. at 389.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 390–95.
97.

The Affirmative Litigation Division is not the only division at the Office of the Corporation Counsel
handling affirmative claims. The Administrative Law Division commences affirmative regulatory
cases under the Nuisance Abatement Law and litigated for years to close adult establishments. See, e.g.,
City of New York v. Stringfellow’s of N.Y., 96 N.Y.2d 51 (2001). The Commercial and Real Estate
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period, the Office of the Corporation Counsel has interpreted the city’s interests
broadly and has been willing to sue to vindicate those broad interests. The city and
its elected officials have been interested, not only in maximizing city revenue through
commercial litigation, but also in litigating on behalf of the broader interests of the
city and the public.

Litigation Division’s affirmative real estate unit brings a wide variety of affirmative litigation, including
complex landlord-tenant proceedings, actions to enforce restrictive covenants, and actions to quiet title
in cases of fraudulent transfer. See, e.g., Office of the Corporation Counsel, New York City Law
Dep’t, Annual Report: 2004–2005, at 17 (2005). The Environmental Law Division has challenged
several federal agencies for failing to regulate or for unlawfully regulating in response to harms, such as
greenhouse gas emissions, that contribute to global warming, smog, and inefficient energy uses. See,
e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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